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York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. vii, 250. $25.
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INTRODUCTION

1
Everyone loves a good scandal. Scandals sell papers. They focus public
2
3
attention and galvanize public opinion. They also divert and entertain.
4
The recent corporate scandals are no exception. Coming, as they did, in
the midst of an economic downturn, they focused public attention on

*

1.

Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. -Ed.
See generally JAMES T. HAMILTON, ALL THE NEWS THAT'S FIT TO SELL (2004).

2. See, e.g. , Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3 1 , 2002, at A l (stating that corporate scandals "helped galvanize support" for the pas
sage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Michael Dresser & David Nitkin, The Political Game, BALT. SUN ,
Apr. 20, 2004, at 2B (quoting a lobbyist's statement that "it takes a scandal to really focus the pub
lic's attention").
The public is mobilized, in part, by the simple fact of media repetition. Constant repetition is
said to give rise to the "availability heuristic" and "cascade effects." See generally Timur Kuran &
Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 5 1 STAN. L. REV. 683 ( 1 999); Cass R.
Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000).
3. See Richard A. Posner, Bad News, N.Y. TIMES, July 3 1 , 2005, § 7 (Book Review), at 1
("[Consumers of news] find scandals, violence, crime, the foibles of celebrities and the antics of the
powerful all mightily entertaining.").

4. A partial list of recent corporate scandals might include Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adel
phia, Martha Stewart's alleged insider trading, and the conflicts of interest among Wall Street
bankers and analysts. See generally Amy Borrus et al., Corporate Probes: A Scorecard, Bus. WK.,
June 10, 2002, at 42 (providing information on several scandals, divided by industry); Robert Frank
et al., Executives on Trial: Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B 1 (providing informa
tion on several executives under investigation).
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corporate governance and galvanized public opinion in favor of reform. 5
They also did not fail to entertain.6
B ut perhaps most importantly, scandals are rhetorically useful. They
provide politicians with ammunition to attack their opponents and assure
commentators of a wealth of material over which to disagree. Here again,
the recent corporate scandals did not disappoint. Democrats and Republi
7
cans in Congress sought to blame the mess on each other, the President
8
pledged to get tough, and the New York State Attorney General built a gu
9
bernatorial campaign out of combating corporate evil-doers. Articles on
10
corporate reform appeared regularly in newspapers and law reviews, and
11
prominent legal academics testified in Washington.

5. See generally Ronald Alsop, Reputations of Big Companies Tumble in Consumer
Survey, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 19, 2004, at B 1 (reporting on results of a Harris Interactive/Reputation
Institute poll that found seventy-five percent of respondents felt that the image of large corpora
tions was either "not good" or "terrible"); Julie Rawe, Heroes to Heels: Several Wall Street
Champs of the '90s Have Fallen from Their Pedestals, TIME, June 17, 2002, at 48 (outlining
improprieties at Tyco, Enron, Global Crossing, and Adelphia and describing the way these activi
ties contributed to an environment of scandal and distrust). On the coincidence of scandal with
economic downturns in provoking reform, see Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regu
lation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997) (showing that for over 300 years,
major changes in securities regulation have tended to follow market collapses).
6. Consider the birthday party, funded through the corporate treasury and captured on
video, that former Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski threw for his wife on the island of Sardinia-a
party featuring tacky costumes, R-rated ice sculptures, and a private performance by Jimmy
Buffet. See Helen Peterson & Nancy Dillon, Hot Party Tape May Spice Up Tyco Trial, DAILY
NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 28, 2003, at 54 (describing party).
7. See Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 417, 41718 (2003) (describing "confirmation bias" that enabled conservatives to see a "triumph of capital
ism" in the scandals while liberals see "stark limitations of capitalism").
8. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Corporate Responsibility
at the Regent Wall Street Hotel (July 9, 2002), available at 2002 WL 1461845 (detailing Presi
dent Bush's "IO-point Accountability Plan for American Business").
9. See, e.g., Kulbir Walha & Edward E. Filusch, Eliot Spitzer: A Crusader Against Cor
porate Malfeasance or a Politically Ambitious Spotlight Hound? A Case Study of Eliot Spitzer
and Marsh & McLennan, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1111 (2005) (detailing Spitzer's investigation
of the insurance industry and other high profile corporate crusades); see also Eliot Spitzer 2006,
Making a Difference for You, http://www.spitzer2006.com (last visited Sept. 9, 2005) (gubernato
rial campaign site).
10. See, e.g., John Thain, Editorial, Sarbanes-Oxley: Is the Price Too High, WALL ST. J.,
May 27, 2004, at A20; Paul Volcker & Arthur Levitt, Jr., Editorial, In Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley,
WALL ST. J., June 14, 2004, at A l 6. Meanwhile law reviews throughout the country hosted sym
posia on corporate governance. See, e.g., Symposium, Crisis in Confidence: Corporate
Governance and P rofessional Ethics Post-Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003); Symposium,
Enron: Lessons and Implications, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1 (2002); Symposium, Lessons from
Enron, How Did Corporate and Securities Law Fail?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 989 (2003).
11. See, e.g., Accounting Reform and Investor Protection: Hearings on the Legislative
History of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Accounting Reform and Investor P rotection Issues
Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 948 (2003) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Profes
sor of Law, Columbia University School of Law); The Fall of Enron: How Could It Have
Happened?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 376 (2002)
(statement of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law); id.
(statement of John H. Langbein, Sterling Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale Law School).
This testimony is collected in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B.
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Now, several years later, it remains unclear what we ought to make of all
of this. Is there a lasting lesson buried amid the noise, or did we simply give
in to cognitive biases causing us to rely excessively on narrative as opposed
12
to statistical data and to weight bad news over good? What, if anything,
can we learn from the corporate scandals that we did not know before?And
how should they shape the thinking of corporate leaders and policymakers
going forward? These are the questions that Professor David Skeel of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School addresses in Icarus in the Board
room: The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate America and Where They
Came From

(hereinafter Icarus in the Boardroom).
is a historical analysis of corporate calamity
that takes us to the beginning of the industrial era to study the periodic epi
sodes of scandal that have roiled American business and stirred the federal
13
government to action. It is an extremely colorful account, peppered with an
14
array of cultural references and fascinating anecdotes. Indeed, because it is
a trade book, aimed at an audience beyond the narrow confines of academia,
Icarus in the Boardroom gives Skeel considerable room to display his wit
and talent for creating lively prose, yet it is an unmistakably serious work of
legal scholarship. Starting with the emergence of the corporate form and
moving through the rise of the large corporation, Skeel provides a nuanced,
historical account of the problems of corporate governance and offers an
innovative set of proposals to address them.
Icarus in the Boardroom

Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). Academics' ultimate conclusions on the causes of the
corporate scandals tended to derive from and confirm their preexisting research agendas. See
Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA . L. REv.
1517, 1563 (2004) ("[T)he legal scholar acting as thought experimenter is left to her own psycho
logical devices in imagining supportive evidence and causal connections as needed to confirm
her 'pet theory.' "); accord Prentice, supra note 7, at 419 (acknowledging his own use of the
scandals to "support ... my attempts in recent years to apply behavioral decision theory to legal
issues ") (footnote omitted).
12. See Roy F. Baumeister et al., Bad Is Stronger Than Good, 5 REV. GEN. PsYC H OL. 323,
323-24 (200 I) ("In general, and apart from a few carefully crafted exceptions, negative informa
tion receives more processing and contributes more strongly to the final impression than does
positive information."); G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Illusory Causation: Why It Occurs, 13 PsYC H OL.
Sci. 299, 299 (2002) ("Illusory causation occurs when people ascribe unwarranted causality to a
stimulus simply because it is more noticeable or salient than other available stimuli."); Sunstein,
supra note 2 at 1065-67 (discussing the availability heuristic and cascade effects).
13. Skeel has used legal history in his previous scholarship.See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL,
DEBT 'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001). For other scholarship
analyzing the corporate scandals in historical context, see generally Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron's Dark Shadows, 57 Bus. LAW. 1421,
1423-30 (2002) (providing historical survey of accounting scandals); Gregory A. Mark, The
Legal History of Corporate Scandal: Some Observations on the Ancestry and Significance of the
Enron Era, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1073 (2003) (surveying American attitudes to business in times of
scandal and success); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REV. 77, 78 (2003) (articulat
ing a historical account of the "the boom-bubble-bust-regulate cycle").
14. Who knew, for example, that Ken Lay's father was a chicken-farmer-cum-Baptist
minister, pp. 144-45, or that Bernie Ebbers had been a college basketball star until his Achilles
tendon was severed by a "local tough" wielding a broken bottle, p. 148. We are also playfully
informed that Samuel Insull s' prodigious energies were rumored to have resulted, at least in part,
from a beautiful spouse who "didn't like sex" and refused to sleep with him. P. 83.
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This Review describes Skeel's account of corporate scandal and evalu
ates his policy recommendations. It argues that although Icarus in the
Boardroom provides a compelling history of corporate scandal, the book's
focus on federal responses to scandal-from the enactment of the Interstate
Commerce Act to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act-misses an important part of the
story. As corporate law scholars have long pointed out, corporations exist
within a network of constraints, based in part on law and in part on markets,
15
norms, and other non-legal sanctions. Because it omits any sustained dis
cussion of the reaction of these other sources of constraint, focusing instead
on the federal reaction, Icarus in the Boardroom is largely incomplete as a
history of scandal and reaction. A comprehensive account requires a more
thorough treatment of other corporate constraints, beginning-this Review
argues-with state corporate law. State courts have long engaged the prob
lem of productive versus destructive risk that motivates Skeel's analysis.
Moreover, this Review argues, the flexibility and interpretive suppleness of
state corporate law jurisprudence may be better suited to respond to the
problems Skeel identifies than a central, typically federal, regulator.
Part I of this Review describes Skeel's account of corporate scandal, fo
cusing on the central theme of excessive risk-taking. Part II examines
Skeel's most original policy proposal-the creation of an investor insurance
scheme to protect against excessive risk. Although the proposal takes up
only a few pages of the book, it targets the books' core concern-the risk of
corporate fraud. In evaluating the proposed investor insurance regime, this
Review raises a set of objections based on cost and administrability and ar
gues that an insurance regime would be duplicative of existing mechanisms
that effectively spread the risk of financial fraud. Part III then discusses the
broader environment of constraint and emphasizes the responsiveness of
state courts to corporate crises. It argues that state judges have every incen
tive to respond to periods of scandal and that state law jurisprudence has
evolved a set of highly flexible mechanisms for increasing or decreasing the
legal oversight of corporate governance. Icarus in the Boardroom, in other
words, emphasizes Icarus, but the perspective is Daedalean. This Review, by
contrast, emphasizes the ability of existing institutions to respond to the
problems Skeel identifies, resisting the impulse to tinker with the system
and federalize ever-greater amounts of corporate governance.
I. A

HISTORY OF BUSINESS SCANDAL

The phrase "corporate scandal" has been applied to a variety of frauds
and failures, most recently including accounting fraud at Enron and World-

15. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1642 (2001) (developing
a theory of the firm based upon "nonlegally enforceable rules and standards"); Robert B. Thomp
son, The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 377, 379 (1990) (pointing to
the "nexus of constraints" in the intra-corporate relationship).
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11
16
Com, looting at Tyco and Adelphia, and corruption among Wall Street
18
investment banks. Going back a bit, a list of major business scandals might
also include the savings and loan crisis (pp. 132-34), the Erie Railroad scan
dal (pp. 33-36), and the tulip and South Sea bubbles (pp. 15- 16). Although
acknowledging the possible breadth of its central theme, the narrative of
Icarus in the Boardroom focuses on four central characters: Jay Cooke,
19
Samuel Insull, Ken Lay, and Bernie Ebbers. W hat these men have in com
mon is their form of failure. The rise and fall of each traces the pattern of
what Skeel describes as "Icarus Effect"failures (p. 7).
An Icarus Effect failure is one in which three core causal factors con
tribute to a financial collapse. The three factors identified by Skeel are
(A) "excessive or fraudulent" risk-taking; (B) competition, both between
and within firms, and (C) the "increasing size and complexity" of business
organizations (pp. 5-6). The relative importance of each of the three factors
is given away by the decision to name the tendency and the book itself after
Icarus, the figure from Greek mythology who flew too close to the sun on
waxen wings. When the heat of the sun melted the wax, Icarus was sent
plunging to his death because, as Skeel interprets the tale, he "thought less
and less about risk, and more and more about the majesty of his powers"
(pp. 4-5). Icarus Effect failures, in other words, are a result of risk-taking
run amok. The fundamental flaw in corporate America, Skeel argues, is the
encouragement and facilitation of excessive risk.
Ken Lay at Enron and Bernie Ebbers at WorldCom are modern exem
plars of the Icarus Effect. Each emerged as a consummate risk-taker by
20
surviving round after round of "probationary crucibles." Here Skeel draws
upon current scholarship in the field of industrial organization describing
executive promotion as an ongoing tournament that rewards short-term suc
cess and discourages loyalty (pp. 170-72). The result of this structure, as

16. See generally William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002) (analyzing the immediate and root causes of the accounting fraud at
Enron and the company's resulting collapse); Simon Romero with Riva D. Atlas, Worldcom's
Collapse: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at C l (describing the fraud and collapse at
Worldcom).
17. See generally Peter Grant & Christine Nuzum, Adelphia Founder and One Son Are
Found Guilty, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2004, at Al (reporting developments in criminal trials of
Adelphia executives accused of corporate looting); Mark Maremont & Jerry Markon, Leading the
News: Former Tyco Executives Are Charged-New York Prosecutors Say Ex-CEO, Finance Offi
cer Ran "Criminal Enterprise ", WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2002, at A3 (describing allegations that
former CEO and CFO stole more than $170 million from the company, engaged in illegal stock
sales, and committed accounting fraud to cover up their activities).
18. See generally Ann Davis & Susanne Craig, Analyze This: Research Is Fuzzier Than
Ever, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at Ci (describing and critiquing the outcome of investigations
into investment analyst conflicts of interest); Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A
Legal and Economic Analysis of the P referential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings,
69 BROOK. L. REV. 583 (2004) (analyzing the conflicting interests involved in the allocation of
in-demand IPO shares).
19. There is also a chapter discussing the rise and fall of junk bond financier Michael
Milken. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
20.

P. 171 (quoting ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES (1988)).
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described by Professor Donald Langevoort, is that tournament survival traits
"such as over-optimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a deep capac
ity for ethical self-deception . . . are disproportionately represented in
21
executive suites." Enron was a paradigmatic example of the corporate cru
cible. As described by Langevoort:
Enron was filled with people who [were] optimistic, aggressive, and fo
cused. The culture quickly identified itself as special and uniquely
competent, believing that special skill rather than luck (or just being first)
was responsible for the early victories.That self-definition then set a stan
dard for how up-and-coming people acted out their roles: Enron was a
place for winners. With this-and the stock market's positive feedback
the company's aspiration level rose.
This aspiration level required a high level of risk-taking by the firm
.... [T]he compensation and promotion structure at Enron ...harshly pe
nalized the laggards at the firm, which, on average, tends to lead to herding
behavior (risk aversion). To counteract this, the company had to magnify
the reward structure considerably for those who ended up as stellar per
22
formers-a winner-take-all kind of tournament.

The same survival traits that this Darwinian process selects in corporate
managers---over-confidence and a taste for risk-can lead them into a spiral
23
of bad decisions and ever-greater risks once their luck begins to faii. Put
this together with the cult of the charismatic CEO and a compensation struc
ture rewarding consistent short-term success and you begin to get at the core
of what Kenny and Bernie did. Theirs, Skeel argues, were Icarus Effect fail
ures, caused by the incentives in modem corporations pushing managers to
take ever-greater risks.
Ebbers's and Lay's forefathers in fraud were Jay Cooke and Samuel In
sull. Skeel credits Cooke, a Philadelphia banker who rose to prominence in
the early 1860s, with leading the United States into its first Icarus Effect
scandal. Cooke was a bond salesman who pioneered a new distribution

21.
Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93
GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004). Langevoort elaborates, noting that "the luckier risk-takers will outper
form more risk-averse realists on average, and the positive feedback will enhance their sense of self
efficacy." Id. at 299. But overconfidence is not enough. Langevoort also identifies the essential trait
of "ethical plasticity":
The person who most likely strikes the right competitive balance in a high-stakes promotion tour
nament is the one who best conceals from others the inclination to defect when necessary
extremely difficult in a corporate setting where one is being closely observed by subordinates,
peers and superiors--yet does so nimbly. People who best deceive others are usually those who
have deceived themselves, for they can operate in a cognitively unconflicted way. The Machiavel
lian with the best survival prospects in the corporate tournament is especially adept at
rationalization: convincing himself as well as others that what is self-serving is also right.

Id. at 303 (footnote omitted).
22.
23.

The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate
and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 973-74 (2002).

Donald C. Langevoort,

Irresponsibility

Id. at 974 (summarizing this cycle by noting that "overconfidence commits them to a

high-risk strategy; once committed to it, they

are

trapped").
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technique by marketing issues to the small financial institutions and private
investors then ignored by other bond houses, essentially inventing retail in
vestment banking (pp. 29-3 1). Having perfected his methods in a series of
highly successful placements of government bonds, Cooke began to under
write and distribute railroad bonds. Unfortunately, following some initial
success, Cooke "bit[] off more than he could chew" by agreeing to under
write a massive bond issue for the Northern Pacific railroad (p. 36). He
could not sell the issue, and when the railroad eventually failed, he could not
repay his investors, unleashing a massive financial crisis known as the 1873
Panic (pp. 3�0). Like the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, this first
Icarus Effect failure involved a businessman who, thanks to a string of suc
cesses, came to believe in his own infallibility and therefore undertook more
and greater risks. When the risks unraveled, Cooke, like Lay and Ebbers
after him, brought enough ruin to stir a political reaction and, ultimately,
24
regulatory intervention.
Samuel Insull became a "corporate superstar" approximately fifty years
after Cooke's fall from grace. A survivor of several probationary crucibles,
Insull first rose to prominence at Thomas Edison's General Electric before
launching his own enormously successful utility company in Chicago, an
organization that he eventually built, through acquisitions, into a vast indus
trial empire that "fed his already gargantuan ego" (p. 84). Acquisitions,
however, would cause lnsull's downfall. Racing to build an empire of cross
holdings to match his rivals and burdening his organization with vast
amounts of debt in the process, Insull "was absolutely unable . . . to imagine
the possibility of his own failure; he entirely lacked the sense of caution of
25
those who doubt themselves." When his creditors finally took over, they
discovered that Insull, like Lay and Ebbers later, had used the corporate
26
structure to obfuscate the actual financial position of the enterprise. As
with other scandals, Insull's collapse brought ruin to many but was a boon to
politicians who sought to use the collapse and Insull himself to illustrate the
dangers of unregulated business (pp. 89-90). Insull's failure fit perfectly
into the rhetoric of the New Deal, and this is precisely how President Frank
lin Roosevelt used it, railing in a famous speech against "the Ishmael or
Insull whose hand is against every man's," and treating Insull as one with
27
the "reckless promoter" and the "unethical competitor." The result of this
24.

As described by Skeel, the

1873 Panic was used by the populist movements of the day to
1887, in

lobby for railroad rate regulation, leading eventually to the Interstate Commerce Act of

which Congress took the matter out of state hands and launched extensive federal regulatory over
sight of the railroad industry. Pp.

48-49.

25. P. 87. The quotation is taken from the principle biography of Insull. FORREST McDON
ALD, INSULL 19 (1962).
26.

P. 88. Skeel makes an explicit parallel between the complex holding-company structure

used by Insull to defraud his investors and the complex structure of derivatives SPE transactions
used by Lay and his CFO Andrew Fastow, noting that the Enron strategy "had an awful lot in com
mon with Samuel lnsull's holding-company manipulations

.

. ." P. 159.
.

27. P. 80 (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, New Conditions Impose New Requirements upon
Government and Those Who Conduct Government, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 742, 755 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938)).
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rhetoric, of course, was a vast increase in governmental regulation of busi
28
ness that nearly resulted in the complete federalization of corporate law.
Skeel's central narrative is the problem of risk. The other Icaran fac
tors-competition and complexity-pale in importance and are perhaps best
29
seen as enabling factors. In fact, Skeel's focus on "excessive or fraudulent
risks" comes close to conflating risk-taking and fraud, which as Professor
Jonathan Macey pointed out in an early review of the book, would be an
obvious error-fraud, after all, involves dishonesty or lying while risk
30
taking, on its own, does not. This objection, however, is not entirely fair.
While it is true that Skeel never sets out a clear line of demarcation between
"excessive" and acceptable risk, the stories he tells enable us to do so.
The failures Skeel focuses on--Cooke's, Insull's, Lay's, and Ebbers's
all arise from a unique set of economic and cognitive factors that push executives to take risks and, when the outcome is not what they had hoped, to
conceal the results and then place even greater bets in hopes of recouping
their prior losses. The Icaran executive is thus a specific type of risk-taker, a
product of successive probationary crucibles, overconfident and overcom
mitted to growth. Although, as Macey has pointed out, risk and fraud are not
points on a continuum, what is special about the Icaran executive is her ten
dency, resulting from a unique incentive structure and psychological make
up, to convert risk-taking into fraud. For this particular species of risk-taker,
it makes sense to discuss risk-taking together with fraud since one so easily
becomes the other. Moreover, addressing the problem through disclosure
obligations alone, because it does not respond to the underlying psychologi
cal biases and economic incentives, would not seem to prevent ·the
31
problem. Skeel's inquiry, therefore, is into the heart of risk-taking. How
can investors be protected against Icaran executives?
II. INSURANCE AGAINST RISK-TAKERS
Having put the problem of magnified risk-taking squarely before us, the
final two chapters of Icarus in the Boardroom address solutions, first re
viewing the spectrum of proposed reforms, then offering an innovative

28.
Comprehensive federalization of corporate law stalled, Skeel notes, because the federal
incorporation statute was appended to an unpopular antitrust bill, p. 105, a political mistake that the
SEC has regretted (and has been trying to correct) ever since. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the
Dream of William 0. Douglas: The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corpo
rate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 79, 80 (2005) (describing the longstanding ambition of the
SEC to regulate corporate governance and noting that the SEC "from time to time, has exploited
scandals in the public securities markets" to achieve the goal of regulating corporate governance).
29. Outsized risk-taking is enabled by a large and complex organization, but a large and
complex organization will not produce scandal without a risk-taking executive at its head. The same
is true of competition. Insull, for example, had competition from the Morgan conglomerates and was
able to mask his financial situation thanks to the complexity of a pyramidal holding structure, but
these things would be benign if not for the Icaran lust for more and greater risk.
30.

Jonathan R. Macey, A Risky Proposition, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2005, at 08.

31. This is Macey's suggestion. See id. ("The government's role is to make sure that entre
preneurs make the proper disclosures.").
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32
proposal. The problem of magnified risk-taking can be managed, Skeel
suggests, through the establishment of a comprehensive investor insurance
scheme. He then offers two complementary models of an investor insurance
regime, both inspired by the deposit insurance program created under the
New Deal (pp. 213-14). Although each is a form of insurance, to distinguish
them, I will call the first "investor insurance" and the second "investor pro
tection." Investor insurance is designed to protect investors from market
wide declines, and investor protection is designed to make whole the victims
of any one corporate fraud. Each proposal is extremely interesting and, at
the same time, deeply problematic.
Investor insurance would guarantee a minimum payout for an invest
ment portfolio over a specified period of time. Skeel suggests, for example,
a 3% payout on funds invested for at least five years (pp. 213-14). Follow
ing this example, if an investor has $100,000 under investment and over a
five-year period the investor's return is less than $3,000, the government
will top off the investor, up to $3,000. If the investor's return is over $3,000,
the government pays nothing. Because the stock market "rarely suffer[s]
multiple-year declines," the proposal, according to Skeel, would not be "a
major cash drain on the Treasury" (p. 214).
The second insurance model, investor protection, would create a com
pensation fund into which all corporations could contribute. The fund would
then be used to make whole any shareholders injured when a participating
corporation's share price plummeted as a result of a financial restatement or
"improper accounting or corporate fraud of the sort alleged in WorldCom
and Enron" (p. 214). The investor compensation fund would be adminis
tered by a new federal agency, the Federal Investor Insurance Corporation
("FIIC"), that in addition to lording over the collective money pot, would
"provide a lot more oversight" of corporations (p. 214). Both of Skeel's pro
posals are open to a variety of objections based on administrability and cost.
First, the dollar costs of investor insurance are likely to be higher than
Skeel suggests. Following the example above, any time gains fall below
three percent, investors could call upon the government to bail them out.
This would get expensive, considering that approximately $13 trillion is
under investment in U.S. equity markets. A flat five-year period could thus
trigger a government obligation of $390 billion. Although such periods are,
as Skeel notes, uncommon (pp. 213-14), they do happen and have, in fact,

32.
In evaluating existing reforms, Skeel critiques the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as excessively
narrow, p. 191, and reviews proposals, among other things, to regulate derivatives, p. 205, monitor
executive compensation, pp. 205--06, re-regulate deregulated industries, p. 207, reform tax and
accounting rules, p. 208, and require mandatory portfolio diversification for employee pension
funds, p. 212. Several of these proposals have been debated in the literature. See, e.g., LUCIAN
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECU
TIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (discussing executive compensation as a central corporate governance
problem); FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINAN
CIAL MARKETS (2003) (discussing role of opaque derivatives transactions in the fall of Enron); see
also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 Tux. L . REv. 1615 (2005)
(reviewing and critiquing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra); John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensa
tion Inefficient Pay Without Performance ?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005) (same).
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happened several times since 1970. An extended bear market could thus
trigger a massive outlay on the part of the ultimate guarantor-that is, U. S.
taxpayers. In addition, this outlay raises distributional concerns. Should tax
payers, many of whom may not be wealthy enough to own substantial
33
investment portfolios, be forced to bail out the wealthier investing class?
Even assuming that tax dollars tend to come from those wealthy enough to
hold investment portfolios, should these dollars really be diverted from other
projects targeted at lower income classes in order to benefit the investing
class?
In addition to the dollar costs and distributional consequences of inves
34
tor insurance, there is also the problem of moral hazard. The guarantee that
investors will always receive a three-percent return creates an incentive for
them to take imprudent risks with their portfolios. Investors may add much
riskier securities to their portfolios or increase their exposure to volatile se
curities through leverage on the basis of the government's promise to top
them up to three-percent in case their strategy generates losses. These incen
tives will tend to lead to an increase in risky portfolios and a sharp rise in
prices, especially for volatile securities, thereby increasing the probability of
35
a crash and a government bailout. Indeed, the deposit-insurance regime,
the inspiration for Skeel's investor-insurance proposal, has been criticized
for creating moral hazard problems that contributed to the savings and loan
36
crisis of the mid-1980s.
Similar objections arise in connection with the investor-protection re
gime outlined by Skeel. Investor protection is also a form of insurance, but
this time the cost of the insurance is paid by corporations themselves
through contributions to an investor-compensation fund administered by the
FIIC. Of course, anything that is funded by a corporation is ultimately
funded by its investors, and so it makes sense to ask whether investors
33.
To use the language of William Jennings Bryan, quoted by Skeel: should the "struggling
masses" be forced to bail out "the idle holders of idle capital?" P. 2 1 1 .
34. Moral hazard i s created when the costs o f a decisionmaker's actions are borne b y others,
often an insurer, causing the decisionmaker to take riskier actions than an even weighing of ex
pected costs and expected benefits would produce. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 4-8 ( 2003) (discussing moral hazard and adverse selection).
35. See generally CHARLES ADAMS ET AL., INT'L MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL CAPI
TAL MARKETS : DEVELOPMENTS, PROSPECTS, AND KEY POLICY ISSUES 70 ( 1 998) (discussing
economic models in which moral hazard leads to market collapse).
36. See Kenneth E. Scott, Never Again: The S&L Bailout Bill, 45 Bus. LAW. 1 883, 1 898
( 1 990) ("The magnitude of [the losses of the FDIC and FSLIC] was occasioned by a literal explo
sion of . . . moral hazard. Uniformly priced deposit insurance constitutes a subsidy to risk taking by
thinly capitalized institutions and induces extreme risk taking by the owners of insolvent institu
tions . "); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK. L. REV . 1
( 1 987). In Professor Miller's words:
The deposit insurance system is often said to create moral hazard on the part of depository in
stitutions by giving them an incentive to take excessive risks with the knowledge that the costs
of unsuccessful risk-taking will be borne by the deposit insurance funds, while the benefits will
be captured by the banks. Thus, the existence of deposit insurance creates a tendency towards
the very action that one wants to protect against.
·

Id. at 19.
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would want to buy this form of anti-fraud insurance. Insurance, after all, is
not free. Insurance premiums reflect not only a policy's risk-an actuarially
determined probability of loss-but also a loading fee reflecting the insurer's
costs.37 This means that it always costs more to buy insurance than to bear a
risk oneself and that individuals should buy insurance only against potential
38
losses that are large enough substantially to diminish their quality of life.
Although investment losses may seem to present precisely this sort of risk, it
is important to remember that the losses guaranteed under the investor
protection program are idiosyncratic and therefore capable of being spread
costlessly (or nearly so) by holding a diversified portfolio. 39 As a result, it is
not clear what, apart from loading fees, an investor gains from investor
protection insurance that she cannot already achieve through portfolio diver
sification.
The investor-protection proposal also seems to add little to the current
investor-compensation regime, which is based on the interplay of securities
law and directors' and officers' liability insurance ("D&O insurance"). Cur
rently investors who are harmed by a financial restatement or an Enron- or
WorldCom-style fraud can sue in a class action under Rule lOb-5 of the Se
40
curities Exchange Act.
Settlements of such claims are typically paid
41
through a company's D&O insurance. If the insurance market is reasona
bly efficient, different companies will pay different premiums for D&O
insurance on the basis of their riskiness, and insurance companies will act as
42
monitors of corporate governance. But even if the insurance market does
not work perfectly, the combination of securities law and D&O insurance
effectively provides a compensation fund for investors harmed by a corpora
tion's fraud or misrepresentations.
The major difference between the existing investor-compensation sys
tem and Skeel's proposal is the creation of the FIIC, a new alphabet-soup
bureaucracy that, in addition to administering the compensation fund, would
37.
KARL H. BORCH, EcONOMICS OF INSURANCE 1 3-15, 163 (Kurt K . Aase & Agnar Sandmo
eds., 1 990) (describing the insurance premium as the sum of the expected claim payment under the
insurance contract, the administrative expenses of the insurance company, and the reward to the
insurer for bearing the risk, later referring to the difference between expected claims payments and
the insurance premium as the "loading" of the contract).
38. See ROBERT I. MEHR & EMERSON CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 35 ( 1 976)
("Insurance for small losses which can be absorbed is uneconomical because the insurance premium
includes not only the Joss cost but also an expense margin.").
39.
For this reason, mandatory portfolio diversification, another of Skeel's suggestions, pp.
2 1 2-13, may be an excellent idea, at least for pension and retirement plans.
40. See 1 7 C.F.R. § 240. IOb-5 (2000 ); see also Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale,
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859
(2003) (describing the multiplicity of situations in which there is a shareholder remedy under Rule
JOb-5).
4 1 . James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Vinuous, 39 ARiz. L. REV. 497,
5 1 2 ( 1 997) ("[A]pproximately 96% of securities class action settlements are within the typical in
surance coverage, with the insurance proceeds often being the sole source of settlement funds.").
42. See Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure
of Details Concerning Directors' & Officers' liability Insurance Policies, 1 54 U. PA. L. REV. 1 147
(2006).
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monitor the fund's corporate members. Is this a good thing? One might
doubt, first of all, whether a government agency has the right incentives to
act as a monitor of corporate governance, especially considering that institu
tional investors have

largely failed to act as monitors of corporate

governance in spite of the fact that they, unlike government bureaucrats,
have their own capital at risk. Government oversight introduces additional
layers of agency costs, including regulators' career incentives and the en

demic problem of regulatory capture.43 In short, instead of agents watching

agents, we would have bureaucrats watching agents.44 As flawed as this
world is, it is hard to see how that would make it a better place.
These problems are not necessarily fatal to Skeel's proposals. For exam
ple, the worst distributional consequences of investor insurance might be
solved by providing it only below a specified threshold of wealth. And it

might be possible to avert the problem of moral hazard by liiniting invest
ment insurance to indexed portfolios. As currently proposed, however, there
is scant detail on how the insurance regime should be crafted to avoid these
problems. Icarus in the Boardroom offers a set of innovative proposals in
skeletal form, just what a trade book should do, but it leaves us eagerly
awaiting Skeel's future academic work to see how the investor-insurance
proposals will be refined.
Ill. A NETWORK OF CONSTRAINT
As corporate law professors advise their students every semester, the
regulation of risk-taking is itself a risky business because it threatens to sti
fle progress and innovation (good risk-taking) along with fraud and failure
(bad risk-taking). Skeel is plainly sensitive to this dilemma. He advertises it,
no doubt, to his own students and recites it obligingly in Icarus in the

Boardroom (p.

196).

Moreover, his proposals stop well short of stifling in

novation-insurance and oversight, after all, are not the same as mandates
and prohibitions. Nevertheless, the book's predominant focus on federal
responses to governance failures renders it largely insensitive to the broader
network of constraints operating· upon corporate managers. This oversight
renders the account as a whole somewhat misleading. After all, it is easy to
support additional regulation when the subject of the regulation-here, cor
porate management-appears largely unconstrained. A closer examination
of the broader network of constraints, however, reveals that corporate man

agers, far from being unconstrained, are held in check by a complex

43. On the capture of regulators by interest groups, see THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980); see also Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 98 QJ. EcoN. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the
Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982); George J. Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Ser. 3 (1971); Robert D. Tollison, Pub
lic Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988).
44. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992).
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regulatory environment. State corporate law courts, backstopped by a vari
ety of market- and norm-based constraints, provide the first line of defense
against Icarus Effect failures. This Part of the Review describes key aspects

of that regulatory environment, ultimately arguing that existing state law

institutions, rather than additional federal regulation, may hold more prom
ising solutions to the problems Skeel identifies.

State corporate law, not federal securities law, is the primary source of
45
authority for corporate-governance problems, and state corporate law has
46
long struggled with the problem of regulating risk. The interplay of the busi
ness judgment rule with the traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty is
explained largely by the twin goals of protecting managerial incentives to take
4
risks while also discouraging fraud. 7 The business judgment rule offers total

This is a function of the so-called "internal affairs" doctrine that delegates authority for
45.
regulating the internal affairs of corporations to states in the absence of specific Congressional en
actments. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987) ("It . . . is an accepted
part of the business landscape in this country for states to create corporations, to prescribe their
powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares."); Santa Fe Indus., Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) ("Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluc
tant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in
securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overrid
den."). But see Thompson & Sale, supra note 40, at 861 (arguing that outside of the context of self
dealing and acquisitions, "corporate governance . . . has passed to federal law and in particular to
shareholder litigation under Rule lOb-5").
46.
See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig Consol. C.A. No. 15452, 2005 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 113, *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) ("(T]he essence of business is risk-the application of in
formed belief to contingencies whose outcomes can sometimes be predicted, but never known.").
Also consider Chancellor Allen's classic statement of the problem:
.•

Corporate directors of public companies typically have a very small proportionate own
ership interest in their corporations and little or no incentive compensation. Thus, they enjoy
(as residual owners) only a very small proportion of any "upside" gains earned by the corpora
tion on risky investment projects. If, however, corporate directors were to be found liable for a
corporate loss from a risky project on the ground that the investment was too risky (foolishly
risky! stupidly risky! egregiously risky!-you supply the adverb), their liability would be joint
and several for the whole loss (with I suppose a right of contribution). Given the scale of op
eration of modem public corporations, this stupefying disjunction between risk and reward for
corporate directors threatens undesirable effects. Given this disjunction, only a very small
probability of director liability based on "negligence", "inattention", "waste", etc. could induce
a board to avoid authorizing risky investment projects to any extent! Obviously, it is in the
shareholders' economic interest to offer sufficient protection to directors from liability for neg
ligence, etc., to allow directors to conclude that, as a practical matter, there is no risk that, if
they act in good faith and meet minimalist proceduralist standards of attention, they can face
liability as a result of a business loss.
Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'!, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Cb. 1996).
47.
The duty of care requires that directors in control of the corporate enterprise exercise the
same level of care that would be expected of an ordinarily prudent person in the conduct of her own
affairs. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188
A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). The duty of loyalty, in its simplest formulation, is a proscription against
director conflict of interest and self-dealing. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). The
business judgment rule, in the words of one commentator:

is simply that the business judgment of the directors will not be challenged or overturned by
courts or shareholders, and the directors will not be held liable for the consequences of their
exercise of business judgment-even for judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes
unless certain exceptions apply.
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW§ 3.4, at 123 (1986).
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48
49
protection for rnistakes but no protection for self-dealing or fraud. This
structure is the result of an attempt to shield managers from liability for
risks that do not turn out as hoped while holding them accountable for at
tempts to defraud the firm or its investors.
Because it is based on the application of these broad principles, state
50
corporate law jurisprudence is highly fact-specific and extremely flexible.
51
The business judgment rule is a moving frontier. Judges decide when and
how it will apply, effectively raising and lowering the hurdle that determines
52
the extent of their intervention in corporate governance. Moreover, they are
granted almost complete autonomy by a statutory structure that leaves the
53
substance of corporate regulation to the judiciary. The authority of the ju
diciary is further enhanced by a weak set of precedents and a very narrow
scope of stare decisis, such that decisions occasionally seem to be largely ad
54
hoc. Finally, an array of rhetorical devices embedded within corporate law
jurisprudence-from "good faith" to "enhanced scrutiny"-allow fiduciary
duties to regulate either lightly or heavily depending upon the circum
55
stances.

48. Plaintiffs bringing a challenge under the duty of care must allege facts that show the
board's conduct is so careless as to constitute "gross negligence." See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1 985); Aronson v. Lewis, 4 73 A.2d 805, 8 1 2 (Del. 1984 ).
49. Plaintiffs bringing a challenge under the duty of loyalty do not bear the burden of e stab
lishing a gross conflict of interest-any material conflict will do. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701 , 7 1 0 (Del. 1983) ("When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a trans
action, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent
fairness of the bargain.").
50. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware's Corporate-Law System: ls Corporate America
Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar's Price Dis
crimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1257, 1259 (200 1 ) ("[M]uch of
Delaware corporate law's indeterminacy and litigation intensiveness is an unavoidable consequence of
the flexibility of the Delaware Model, which leaves room for economically useful innovation and
creativity.").
51.
Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law
Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. I (2005) (articulating a theory of corporate law jurisprudence based on
the judiciary's response to the twin threats of corporate migration and federal preemption).
The question of j udicial intervention in corporate decisionmaking has been described by
52.
former Chief Justice Veasey as the "defining tension" in corporate law and by former Chancellor
Allen as "the tension that occupies its core." William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22
DEL. J. CORP. L. 894, 894-95 ( 1 997); E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Gov
ernance in America, 52 Bus. LAW. 393 ( 1 997).
53. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 8 1 8 A.2d 914, 939 (2003) ("The beauty of
the Delaware corporation law . . . is that the framework is based on an enabling statute with the
Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court applying principles of fiduciary duty in a common law
mode on a case-by-case basis.") (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
54. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 06 1 (2000) (noting that the Delaware judiciary is less bound by prin
ciples of res j udicata and stare decisis than other courts).
55. See Griffith, supra note 5 1 ; see also Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate
Law Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 Bus. LAW. l (2005).
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The responsiveness and interpretive subtlety of state corporate law is
best illustrated by a consideration of Delaware's takeover jurisprudence be
56
ginning in the watershed year of 1985.
A. Takeover Jurisprudence
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, American corporations began to fall
victim to hostile takeover bids. These were troubled economic times-with
inflation, interest rates, and unemployment all high-and takeovers seemed
57
to make matters worse. The financiers who engineered the deals were
popularly reviled-vilified as cannibalistic raiders, taking personal advan
tage of a weakened national economy and putting employees out of
58
work -while in academic quarters and in Washington, they were cele
brated for enhancing the efficiency of corporate America. 59
In the thick of this controversy, the Delaware Supreme Court handed
down a highly significant set of fiduciary duty decisions that served, at least
in the short term, to increase the scope of judicial intervention in corporate
60
governance. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the court loosened the standard of
gross negligence to permit it to second-guess a board's decision to approve a
61
takeover. In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, the court invented the standard of
"intermediate scrutiny" to intervene in matters of takeover defense, setting
limits on the ability of an incumbent board to resist an unwanted takeover
62
offer. And in Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, the court created
"Revlon duties" to restrict the ability of a target board to favor one buyer
over another.
In each of these cases, Delaware courts responded to crisis by creating a
means for greater judicial intervention. However, this increase in judicial
63
intervention did not last. The impact of each of the watershed decisions has
been substantially reduced. Van Gorkom was immediately reversed by the

56.
See Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey, Speech Presented at the 4th Annual Mergers and
Acquisitions Insight Information Co. (June 1 8, 200 1 ), reprinted in The Roles of the Delaware
Courts in Merger and Acquisition Litigation, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 849 (2001 ) (describing the
"watershed in Delaware corporate jurisprudence" in 1985).
57.
3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 70-73 (2002)
(describing the economic environment in the late 1 970s and early 1980s as a time of rapidly increas
ing inflation and shocks in the world oil market resulting in action by the Federal Reserve Board to
constrain inflation by increasing interest rates, leading to a recession, with unemployment reaching
1 0.7% in 1 982).
58.

See, e.g., WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987).

See, e.g. , Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in
59.
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 3 1 4, 329-37 (John C.
Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988) (describing positive economic effects of bust-up takeovers).
60.

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).

61.

493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

62. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1 985); see also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533
A.2d 585, 603 (Del. Ch. 1987) (describing "Revlon duties").
63.

Griffith, supra note 5 1 , at 62.
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64
65
Delaware legislature. Unocal was slowly eroded through lax application.
66
Revlon was narrowed. Each of these changes reduced the scope of judicial
intervention in board decisionmaking.
Delaware's retreat from its own doctrinal innovations can be explained by
the incentives operating upon the judiciary. Just as Delaware is the nation's
leading exporter of corporate law, Delaware judges are the leading authori
67
ties on corporate law. Yet the authority of Delaware judges over corporate
law matters is subject to two pervasive threats-<:orporate migration and
federal preemption. If enough corporations leave Delaware to incorporate in
other states-whether because Delaware is too friendly or too hostile to
68
management -then the authority of the Delaware judiciary will be re
duced. Similarly, if the federal government enacts laws or regulations that
move the substance of corporate law, in whole or in part, into the federal
sphere, the authority of the Delaware judiciary over those matters is effec
69
tively preempted. We can therefore expect the Delaware judiciary to design
its jurisprudence to protect itself against these threats.
64.

DEL . CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b )(7) (2004).

65. See, e.g. , Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 65 1 A.2d 1 36 1 , 1384 (Del. 1995) ( allowing
boards to refuse offers that are not coercive but merely inadequate); Paramount Commc' ns, Inc. v.
Time, Inc., 5 7 1 A.2d 1 140, 1 153 (Del. 1 990) ( rejecting an interpretation of Unocal that would have
required the court to judge and the board to choose the best deal); Moran v. Household Int'!, Inc.,
500 A.2d 1 346, 1 350 (Del. 1985) ( upholding poison pill under Unocal scrutiny); accord Robert B .
Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: "Sacred Space " in
Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REv. 26 1 (2001) ( finding that, except for those cases involving
Revlon duties, the vast majority of Chancery Court decisions and all Supreme Court decisions be
tween 1985 and 2002 approved the board's defensive devices in spite of claiming to apply
intermediate scrutiny).
66. See generally Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1 286 (Del. 1989) ("Revlon
does not demand that every change in the control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated
bidding contest."); Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1 993)
( holding that Revlon duties could also be triggered by a stock-for-stock deal that caused a target
corporation to go from being diffusely held to having a controlling shareholder); Paramount
Commc 'ns, Inc. v. Time, 57 1 A.2d at 1 150 (limiting Revlon duties to situations in which the board
has "abandon[ed] its long-term strategy" and "seeks an alternative transaction . . . involving the
breakup of the company").
67. See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 350 ( 200 1 ) ("The aggregated choices of a majority of publicly
traded U.S. corporations have resulted in a convergence on the Delaware General Corporation Law
as a de facto national corporate law.").
68.
The race-to-the-bottom thesis suggests that the management's dominant role in deciding
where firms incorporate will lead to lax corporate law. See, e.g. , William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701 ( 1 974) (describing "the present
predicament in which a pygmy among the 50 states prescribes, interprets, and indeed denigrates
national corporate policy"). The theoretical foundations of the race-to-the-bottom thesis, however,
have been undermined by an argument that the race creates incentives for states to appeal to share
holders rather than harming them-that it is a race, in other words, to the top. See generally Daniel
R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom " Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware 's
Corporate Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 9 1 3 ( 1 982) (challenging the Cary thesis); Roberta Romano, Law
as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 225 ( 1 985) (arguing
that state competition results in a race to the top); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Pro
tection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 25 1 ( 1 977) (same).
69. Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J.
CORP. L. 625 ( 2004) (discussing the effects of possible preemption on Delaware law); Mark J. Roe,
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Delaware's takeover jurisprudence is an example of these incentives in
action. Federal preemption was a significant threat to the Delaware judiciary
in the early and rnid- 1980s, when pro-takeover forces were strong in Wash
70
ington. The judiciary therefore reacted-in Van Gorkom, Unocal, and
Revlon-by increasing judicial scrutiny of board conduct and limiting the
ability of management to resist takeover bids. At the same time, however,
there was also a significant pro-management lobby that threatened to rein
corporate elsewhere if Delaware law became too hostile. This lobby was
successful in persuading the legislature to overturn Van Gorkom and later,
when the threat of federal preemption had faded, in persuading the courts to
moderate their takeover jurisprudence. Courts began to apply Unocal less
aggressively and to narrow Revlon but, by retaining the principle of inter
mediate scrutiny, never to the point at which other states could steal
71
incorporations by appealing to shareholders.
The lesson of this episode is that it is impossible to understand how cor
porate constraints change in response to scandal by focusing on the federal
regulator alone. Federal regulation is important, of course, but it is not the
entire story. Equally important, but more nuanced, is the way in which the
network of constraint as a whole adapts to corporate crises. State law, in
particular, is highly flexible and able to act prospectively, changing in re
sponse to the mere possibility of federal regulation. Thus, although Icarus in
the Boardroom addresses takeovers in a chapter portraying Michael Milken
72
as an Icaran executive, the discussion ultimately fails to comprehend the
complexity of the regulatory response and, as Skeel acknowledges, does not
quite fit with the central themes of the book (pp. 140-42 ). What is missing
is a more nuanced description of the interconnectedness of the various
sources of regulatory authority within the overall network of constraint and,
with it, an account of the plasticity of corporate law j urisprudence.
B. Icarus Effect Jurisprudence
The narrative structure of Icarus in the Boardroom is corporate scandal
followed by regulatory response. The principal regulatory focus is the fed
eral government, which as others have noted, tends to impose its governance
73
terms on corporations in a one-size-fits-all manner. Yet each Icarus Effect
Delaware's Competition, 1 17 HARV. L. REv. 588 ( 2003) (describing the substance of Delaware law
in light of the risk of federal preemption).
70. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware 's Politics, 1 1 8 HARV. L. REv. 249 1 , 25 10 ( 2005) ("[l]n the
mid- l 980s,] powerful policymakers in the Administration favored takeovers.").
71.
This process is described in greater detail in Griffith, supra note 5 1 , at 63-68. Moreover,
residual inefficiencies in state law may be resolved by private ordering. See Marcel Kahan & Ed
ward B. Rock, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover
Low, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 8 7 1 (2002) (arguing that adaptations such as incentive compensation and
independent boards mitigate the seemingly harsh anti-takeover effects of state law).
72.
Pp. 1 25-32. However, Skeel's characterization of Delaware law during this period as
"Hamlet-like" is both pithy and apt. P. 1 38.
73.
See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey with Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Dela
ware Corporate Law and Governance From 1992-2004 ? A Retrospective on Some Key
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failure described by Skeel-whether Cooke's, Insull's, Lay's, or Ebbers's
is closely tied to situation-specific factors, unique conditions within the or
ganization or business environment pushing the executive to convert risk
into fraud. The problem of the Icaran executive is therefore ill-suited to a
federal regulatory solution. The Icarus Effect requires a more nuanced re
sponse, better suited to the responsiveness and interpretive subtlety of state
corporate law.
Corporate law courts could respond to the Icarus Effect, as they re
sponded to the takeover crisis, by increasing judicial scrutiny. The standard
of judicial deference to boards, in other words, would be lowered when the
board has reason to know it has promoted or hired an Icaran executive. How
should boards know they are dealing with an Icarus Effect situation? In spite
of being highly situation-specific, Icarus Effect failures have a number of
common features. Professor William Beaver of Stanford Business School
suggests that earnings management is most likely when a particular set of
factors is present-specifically: (1) a company has experienced unusually
high growth, (2) management attributes this growth to skill rather than luck,
(3) management has made continued growth an integral part of corporate
strategy, (4) management is arrogant or naive about its prospects for sustain
ing such growth, and (5) management perceives the financial reporting and
74
internal controls as a nuisance or subservient to entrepreneurial goals.
Similarly, Langevoort emphasizes that fraud is more likely when the CEO
has won her position by making grand promises, thus triggering a "winner's
75
curse" problem-that is, the inability, once hired, to fulfill her promises.
These same factors can be found in each of the paradigmatic Icarus Effect
failures identified by Skeel. The Enron board, for example, should have
been especially suspicious of the financial dealings and results reported by
its managers given the hyper-competitive tournament atmosphere that pre
76
vailed within the firm.
In designing a jurisprudential response to Icarus Effect risk, corporate
law courts would thus hold directors to a higher standard of oversight when
Developments, 1 5 3 U. PA. L. REv. 1 399, 1 4 1 2 (2005) (contrasting Delaware corporate law with
federal regulation); see also Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 1 14 YALE L.J. 1 5 2 1 (2005) (critiquing recent federal regulation of corporate
governance).
74. William H. Beaver, What Have We Learned From the Recent Corporate Scandals That
We Did Not Already Know?, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1 55, 163 (2002) (further noting that "based
upon the information disseminated in the financial press, the [corporate scandals] appear to fit these
conditions quite well").
Langevoort, supra note 2 1 , at 305--06 (discussing the winner's curse problem in connec
75.
tion with CEO hiring and the tendency to hire not the most able but the most optimistic executive).
In his words:
If fraudulent reporting is triggered by a winner's curse problem, for example, then the intensity
of the audit checks into managerial truthfulness (including the CEO's own candor) has to vary
with the index of internal pressure. An internal reporting controls system that does not have a
thermostat built into it to adjust when performance becomes overheated is a deficient system.
Id. at 3 1 6.
76.

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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they design an aggressive promotion tournament within the firm or, alter
nately, when they hire an executive who has risen through such a structure
in another firm. When, by contrast, boards do not adopt a set of incentives
likely to lead to an Icarus Effect failure, courts would exercise traditional
deference in the reviewing board conduct. Furthermore, this shifting of
standards would not necessarily be fatal to the board. A board could carry its
burden by showing that it had screened for traits suggested by Beaver and
Langevoort and, when it found them, exercised continuing scrutiny of man
77
agement's conduct and reports. The role of corporate law would thus be to
ensure that the degree of board scrutiny was suited to the managerial incen
78
tive structure within the firm. A board that does not tailor its level of
scrutiny to the incentives that it has created has arguably failed to act in
compliance with its fiduciary duties. State fiduciary duty law is sufficiently
flexible to allow this intervention under several doctrinal rubrics, including
79
the emerging jurisprudence of good faith.
Would such an interpretation of fiduciary duty solve the problem of the
Icarus Effect? It is worth remembering, at this point, that state corporate law
overlays a background of market forces and norms that also serve to con
strain the decisionmaking of corporate managers. Product, labor, and capital
markets discipline managers for making foolish decisions during the life of
80
a firm. Similarly, markets have evolved mechanisms to detect and sanction
81
fraud, and the D&O insurance market may already screen companies on
82
the basis of their susceptibility to Icarus Effect failures. This system of
constraints may deter managerial misbehavior without the involvement of
any court. Should the judiciary become involved, however, we may be com
forted by the fact that corporate law judges, pressured by the twin threats of
corporate migration and federal preemption, have ample incentive to police

77.

See supra notes 74-76.

78. Corporate law courts often emphasize that they are not "super-directors." E.g., Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 266 (Del. 2000) (''To rule otherwise would invite courts to become super
directors, measuring matters of degree in business decisionmaking and executive compensation.");
In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S'holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *22 n. 1 3 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 3 1 , 1989) (''To recognize in courts a residual power to review the substance of business deci
sions for 'fairness' or 'reasonableness' or 'rationality' where those decisions are made by truly
disinterested directors in good faith and with appropriate care is to make of courts super-directors.").
In evaluating the level of scrutiny applied by the board, however, courts could avoid reviewing the
quality of actual business decisions-the firm's risk-reward calculation-by focusing instead on
whether the internal system of checks and balances was suited to the incentive structure within the
firm.
79. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 15452, 2005 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 1 1 3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) (discussing possible interpretations of the corporate law doc
trine of good faith); see also Griffith, supra note 5 1 .
80.

See Rock & Wachter, supra note 1 5 , at 1643-44.

8 1 . Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CoRP. L. I , 47-57 (2002) (describing the ability of the market
to respond to fraud and wrongdoing).
82.
See Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper, supra note 42 (arguing that D&O insurers un
derwrite coverage on the basis of corporate governance risk).

1266

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 1 04: 1 247

the barrier efficiently.83 Policing managerial misconduct efficiently may
mean there is some residual risk of an Icarus Effect failure, but pushing for a
complete solution returns us to the basic corporate law dilemma of regulat
ing too much and stifling good and bad risks alike.
In other words, although there may be some gaps in the web of con
straints, it is telling that Skeel had to go back over a century to find four
good stories of failure. This is not to say that the corporate scandals are un
important. Skeet's historical account successfully brings together insights
from industrial organization and behavioral psychology to teach a lesson
about the fundamental flaws in corporate America. Nevertheless, it is a les
son that is probably best directed at members of the judiciary in Wilmington
rather than the politicians and regulators in Washington.
CONCLUSION

In sum, Icarus in the Boardroom provides an excellent historical analy
sis of four episodes of scandal that have roiled American business. It also
provides a superb illustration of the political use to which such events have
been put, including the populist reform efforts following Cooke's collapse
and Roosevelt's use of Insull in the rhetoric of the New Deal, ultimately
stirring the federal government to action. The thread unifying these episodes
is the Icaran executive-the consummate risk-taker and overconfident survi
vor of successive probationary crucibles, for whom risk-taking tends easily
to transform into fraud. According to Skeet's account, the Icaran executive is
the personification of the fundamental flaws of corporate America. And it is
a convincing story.
Still, the book's focus on the federal regulatory response is somewhat
misleading because it overlooks the broader network of constraints operat
ing upon corporate managers. It is possible, of course, that this broader
network of constraints was not fully in place at the time of Cooke or Insult,
but the fact that it is in place now might explain why after Enron and World
Com, as Skeel notes, there were "far fewer calls for a complete rethinking of
the policies of the past twenty years-such as the scope of deregulation
than one might have expected" (p. 210). That dog might not have barked
because more Americans now than ever before are investors and, as inves
tors, they recognize that extra regulation, in light of the existing framework
of constraint, could easily have amounted to excessive regulation, threaten
ing the efficiency of the capital market and the value of their own
investment portfolios.
When executives appear unconstrained, it is tempting to design con
straints for them. Hence the book's innovative but ultimately problematic
suggestion that the federal government establish an investor-insurance re
gime and set up a new agency to administer it. In making this proposal,

83. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70. Moreover, the increase in judicial scrutiny of
boards following the corporate scandals suggests that courts have indeed sought to police this bar
rier more e ffectively. See Griffith, supra note 5 1 .
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Skeel has assumed the role of Daedalus, the mythological father of Icarus,
famed for his tinkering and inventions, who concocted the artifice that car
ried the boy aloft. With a better pair of wings, Icarus might not have
crashed, and in his policy recommendations, Skeel proffers a better set of
wings, a way of controlling the costs of excessive risk in American business.
This Review has taken a different approach and, rather than contriving a
new device to fix the problems that Skeel identifies, instead seeks to empha
size the subtle ways in which existing institutions might address them.
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